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Abstract.  This article describes the construct of personality and identifies problems of the construct for 
application to viable personnel security programs on land, on and under the seas, in the sky, and in 
space. 
 
Think of it this way.  One’s perception could embrace one thing only or more than one thing at any 
moment in time.  And that one thing could be everything, something, or nothing.  As well, the more than 
one thing being perceived could be combinations of everythings, somethings, or nothings.  The sky and 
beyond are the limits. 
 
This rather abstract and, perhaps, abstruse introduction suggests that any individual person, some 
people, or all people could—some or all of the time—or could not—some or all of the time—perceive in 
such a manner so that the kinds and numbers of perceptions might be quite different than how they 
generally are thought to be perceived.  It might even be the case that there are people who perceive in a 
radically different fashion—e.g., a fashion wherein there is no construct of person, no construct of self 
versus other, no construct of them versus us.  Such people, however, are either extremely proficient at 
acting as if they perceive like others believe that people perceive or, perhaps, correctly believe that 
people who perceive in a manner that is different than how they perceive are unusually inadequate in 
perceiving that the former sort of person perceives in such a manner.  Here it is interesting to note that 
there could even be people who believe that people perceive in a particular manner and who 
concurrently hold the belief that people do not perceive in the same particular manner. 
 
So, before we take the plunge and look at something called personality, we must at least realize that this 
something may be nothing more than a language convention corresponding to some perceptual 
content—a convention that may be, in turn, convenient, inconvenient, or inert as to seeming to 
understand and making our way in the world.  And we must realize that as far as we are aware of 
ourselves and something outside of ourselves, the very notion that there is a person or people to whom 
something called personality would be applied is only one of many abstract notions—each vying for 
perceptual prepotency and existential constituence as the core to an understanding of the world. 
 
Anyway, in the world of academic psychology—a world in which people are formally sanctioned by a 
society as having special competence even if they may not have such competence—and in the world of 
lay psychology—a world in which people are not formally sanctioned by a society as having special 
competence even if they have such competence—personality most often denotes something 
psychological that makes a person that person as opposed to some other person.  Here psychology and 
psychological comprise thoughts, emotions, motivations, and behaviors (cf. Alexander, 1990). 
 
Cognitive components of personality include, not only what is thought, but also how, when, and where 
thoughts occur.  Sensation, perception, and fantasy also are examples of thought.  Thought components 
also can be characterized by their types of logic, rationality, and association.  It is even posited that 
thoughts can be unconscious which means that one can plausibly take credit for having all thoughts 
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good and bad or, more narcissistically, for all thoughts one wants to have including those thoughts that 
one doesn’t want to have but finds some sort of gain in owning up to having them. 
 
Emotional components of personality include what are commonly referred to as feelings, nothing more 
than feelings, in all their content dimensions from happy to sad to loving to hating.  Emotional 
components also include the degree of arousal or quiescence and the lability of emotional content.  
And, again, emotions may be unconscious according to some academic and lay searchers of the 
psychological truth—a reality that, if real, renders one helpless against accusations of emotional 
betrayal and vacuity by our friends and enemies alike, for they may claim knowledge of us that we seem 
not to know.  In addition, there are even thoughts about emotions and their expression that either or 
both are good, or bad, or indifferent in and of themselves.  Sometimes, these thoughts even have 
gender-linked content so that emotional expression in males and in females is good or bad, dependent 
on situation, society, culture, or specific magic moments. 
 
Motivational components of personality include the purposes—sometimes labeled as goals—of the 
varying components of personality including other motivations.  Beyond the notion of unconscious 
motivations, there is a raging philosophical controversy on whether motivations are ultimately 
motivational—in other words, whether motivations are themselves the purposes and goals of human 
psychology or are mere expressions of human psychology without necessarily being constituted as 
purposes or goals or suggesting that there are any such things at all.  To suggest that there may be no 
purposes and goals to life strikes such terror into many people that there is a research tradition in 
psychology labeled terror management that is a foundation for attempts to make predictions about 
aspects of human personality when the salience of confrontation with life as a meaningless and 
unpredictable void is increased.  It may also be noted that it is politically incorrect in many academic 
circles to assume that life, history, and even individual people have a purpose, a goal, or even a coherent 
meaning.  This is certainly not a comforting thought in developing management strategies in 
organizations. 
 
Behavioral components of personality include both external and internal acts—the latter even including 
the beating of the heart, covert kinesthetic movements, and neurotransmitter and hormonal secretion.  
There is at least one school of thought that behavior is the only thing that really matters when 
addressing personality—that the other aforementioned personality components are apocryphal 
remnants of thought (even if thought as an apocryphal remnant of thought is, well, thoughtless), that 
they lack valid ontological status, or that the other alleged personality constituents are irrelevant to 
personality.  There also are schools of thought that certain levels of analysis of personality are more 
important to personality than others.  For example, some formally sanctioned and lay psychologists 
believe that variants of biological or social substrates of personality are the be-all-and-end-all of 
understanding people.  Often there is a very high positive correlation between the area of socially 
sanctioned expertise with which an academic is remunerated for services and the belief in a particular 
be-all-and-end-all. 
 
Although the above four components commonly constitute something called personality, the question 
remains whether personality is a useful mode of thinking about people; whether it is only a useful mode 
of thinking about people; whether it has some ontological validity irrespective of being useful; or 
whether we are fated to enter the familiar philosophical conundrums of entertaining the notions that 
we are only brains in a vat, that we are running a doomed race against the demon possibility of doubt 
about whether we rally exist, or of being unable to differentiate between being asleep and awake—the 
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last a practical matter affecting many academics who lecture throughout the world (cf. Elms, 1994; 
Runyan, 1997). 
 
To posit that personality pertains to something psychological that makes that person that person as 
opposed to someone else, personality theorists—whether our formally credentialed and socially 
sanctioned experts on personality or lay psychologists that comprise all people (and, indeed, this may 
well include all people including the sanctioned experts) who employ a personality construct—usually 
mean the following. 
 
First, there is something about each person that is shared with all other people that makes each person 
a person as opposed to someone or something else.  Second, there is something about each person that 
is shared with some other people.  Third, there is something about each person that is shared with no 
one else. 
 
Now, one might assume that only what is shared with no one else qualifies as personality in that 
personality pertains to what makes each person that person as opposed to someone else.  However, 
what is shared with no one else is not only just the isolated aspects of uniqueness but also how what is 
shared with all others and some others are integrated or not completely integrated together and with 
those very isolated aspects of uniqueness.  In fact, the very notion of isolated aspects of uniqueness is 
questionable because the person as person seems to be innately intradependent and interdependent 
with other psychological aspects and other people respectively. 
 
However, personality may be but an example of language usage and associated cognition that is shared 
by members of a social population.  Even the shared language usage may mask covert differences in 
associated cognitions among users of the personality construct.  Thus, shared language usage and 
shared and different cognitions about something called personality may themselves constitute all of 
personality or at least an important aspect of it.  Moreover, it may well be that the concatenation of 
cognitions about something called personality that characterizes various components of a social 
population exemplifies a false consciousness, awareness, or phenomenology.  In this sense, what people 
believe about people encapsulated in the construct of personality bears no necessary correspondence 
to optimal utility in achieving people’s purposes and goals—even if it seems to.  What’s more, the belief 
in personality may facilitate one’s exploitation by other people with significant political, social, cultural, 
and economic power (cf. Sloan, 2001). 
 
In any case, the denotation of personality as something psychological that makes that person that 
person as opposed to someone else has a number of difficulties and complexities hat have been alluded 
to above and will be elaborated upon below.  These present a huge challenge to space security 
authorities seeking to minimize psychological threats to security. 
 
Personality, Language, and Reality.  Beyond the hypotheses of personality as a mere language 
construction and of personality’s construction and constructed components as unique in meaning for 
each and every person is the additional difficulty of the compatibility of language and reality.  Some 
people posit that language and reality are identical in that reality is language dependent and can only be 
constructed and construed through language.  Other people posit that language is as one with 
perception and is the tool one ultimately employs to seek some asymptotic approximation of reality.  
Still other people posit the identity of language and reality but that this reality mandates nothing 
necessarily about whether there is such a thing as reality or what this reality might be or be like—i.e., 
whether there is such a thing as a thing in itself.  And yet others posit that the relationship between 
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language and reality is unknowable because the infinite choices on some continuum running from 
holistically to atomistically constructing reality are devoid of valid criteria bearing on what to choose. 
 
Language may be the only perspective outside of which one cannot escape to analyze.  This existential 
fate—as with the enigma that nonsense is the only kind of sense one can sense—does not augur well for 
one embarked on a journey of enlightenment towards an endpoint of understanding, predicting and 
influencing people in the space security world. 
 
Theories of Personality.  Still, a significant and hallowed research tradition in academic psychology is the 
construction of macro-theories of personality (Young-Bruehl, 1994).  Each constructor of a macro-theory 
purports to identify and expound upon that theme which is most salient in understanding what makes 
people people.  Individual differences in people are explained as variations of the salient theme(s).  Yet 
the salient theme(s) may well suggest more about the constructor’s personality including the 
constructor’s personal beliefs about people masquerading as esteemed professional opinion than about 
the people to be described, explained, or understood.  One often is left with the intuition that there are 
infinite variants of elements within a stream of consciousness or abstractions from such elements that 
could as well qualify for personality themes.  Much as many readers of Finnegan’s Wake and even 
Ulysses are left with huge leaps to approximate the constructor’s meanings, one may face various 
personality theories with huge leaps of faith still falling short of validating various salient  themes 
championed by a personality theorist. 
 
Numbers of Integrated Components.  Related to the infinite choices on some continuum running from 
holistically to atomistic constructing reality are the four classes of personality components—viz., 
cognition, emotional, motivational, and behavioral.  The four classes could as well be two or seven or 
ninety nine and a half.  They can interrelate and be integrated in many different ways.  Different classes 
of components and elements of these components also can differ in their significance and salience for 
different people in the context of all aspects of psychological functioning.  Time- and cost-effective 
methods to assess all these differences for even one person—let alone many people—are probably not 
an option based on today’s state-of-the-art research in academic psychology. 
 
It is the very choice of attempting to seek the truth that may be the culprit behind the fool’s errand of 
identifying the right number of integrated personality components.  Perhaps, all that can be done is to 
offer up layers and layers of meaning that may or may not resonate with the reader and potential 
acolyte of a personality theory.  In fact, one would still be left with an even more dire complexity: the 
confrontation of meanings from the constructor of personality theory and those from the many readers 
of such theory. 
 
Personality as Interpersonal.  Personality—beyond denoting what psychologically makes a person that 
person as opposed to some other—seems premised on a construct that is individual as opposed to 
social.  In other words, personality is described as something possessed by a person, manifested by a 
person, and characterizing a person only in some acontextual living space—even if one is attempting to 
ascribe something social about an individual. 
 
Yet, can any psychological aspect of a person be truly divorced from that person’s interactions with 
others?   Even when physically alone, a person is accompanied by other people in cognition, emotion, 
motivation, and behavior.  Perhaps it is language that is the source of inadequate meaning constraining 
and interpersonal analysis.  And this becomes even more of an Issue when interpersonal is broadened as 
appropriate to encompass interobject wherein object includes one’s perceptions. 
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A prescription for personality assessment in the service of space security would be to focus on an 
individual’s interpersonal style towards other personality types as well as traits presumed internal to 
that individual. 
 
Personality as Situational.  To continue with the contextual nature of personality, one might well note 
that not only is personality intimately related to the interpersonal but also to the situational.  And 
situational denotes not only the immediate physical, psychological, and social and cultural milieu, but 
also long-term historical and even evolutionary trends. 
 
Again, the notion of personality as something presumed to be internal to the person is highly suspect, 
incomplete, and misleading.  When attempting to understand, predict, and influence a person, one then 
becomes at the mercy of events beyond one’s control and even beyond one’s apprehension. 
 
Personality as Conscious, Preconscious, and Unconscious.  It may well be that awareness and personality 
intersect but are not completely contiguous.  In other words, some of personality may be unknown to 
the person being characterized by that personality.  Briefly, that of which a person is aware is conscious.  
That of which a person is not aware but can be relatively easily is preconscious.  That of which a person 
is not aware and cannot be or can be only with very significant degrees of difficulty is unconscious. 
 
It is this last that is most problematic.  For how can one show that something psychological—especially 
intrapsychic—about a person that is unknown to that person can be known to someone else about that 
person?   This question is complicated by at least two types of knowing.  The first type denotes believing 
that one knows something, the latter actually knowing something whether one believes it or is aware of 
the belief or of what the belief is about.  And if one can know something without being aware of it, one 
might end up with an absurd social configuration of psychological experts dueling about the personality 
of an individual even as they may know most about that individual in an unconscious manner. 
 
Perhaps, it is the case that the unconscious is but a robust stalking horse for motives in others about 
oneself that are not unknown but are unspeakable.  These motives would then have a power that 
recedes into nothingness once spoken of—much as so-called primitive and primeval beliefs about losing 
one’s soul once one’s words or physiognomy are captured on text or by photograph dissipates once it 
becomes public that the soul seems to have survived. 
 
Personality as Inescapable.  In fact, one might be puzzled over how the personality of one person can be 
assessed by another.  The another also presumably can be characterized by a personality that makes 
that another another as opposed to the person being assessed by another.  How can the another escape 
this personality to assess the person without that person serving only as a vehicle for the manifestation 
or expression of the another’s personality?  And when does consensus or divergence of the opinions of 
many anothers about a person bear mostly on the personalities of the anothers or on the person?  This 
last point again bears on the competing meanings of constructors of personality theory and readers of 
theory who may nothing more or nothing less than constructors of theory through their readings of 
theory. 
 
Personality as Temporal and as Quantitatively Ambiguous.  The personality construct almost always is 
assumed to have temporal qualities.  That is, aspects of personality may change with time irrespective of 
interpersonal and situational elements.  Yet when personality is assessed not to have changed over 
some interval, does one assume that personality has, indeed, not changed?  Or has the assessment 
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technique or approach not picked up the change?  And if personality is assessed to have changed, how 
does one differentiate change from an inaccurate measurement of two or more temporal states of 
personality that have actually remained constant? 
 
In fact, the very constancy of measurement through time often is assumed to support the reliability and 
even the validity of a personality assessment instrument, while inconstancy is assumed to support 
neither!  This bears on the contention of many academics touched by the still lively (in the United 
States) rubric of postmodernism that each person can be concurrently and through time characterized 
by multiple selves—a nightmare for any human resources or security manager in an organization. 
 
Personality as Cross-Cultural.  Concepts such as national character, ethnic character, ethnicity, racial 
profiling, and the like bear on the notion that there are group differences in personality that are much 
more significant than individual differences within a group.  Yet one might note that each individual may 
be said to reside within an at least partially unique culture—regardless of shared cultural comments—
through at least partially unique personality components.  Added difficulty and complexity relates to 
similar personality assessment procedures being construed differently by different assessees and 
assessors—all of whom reside within at least partially unique cultures. 
 
So the problem one is left with becomes how to traverse from the crude simplicity of cross-cultural 
psychology as the psychology of various artificially constructed groups—each based on skin color, 
geographical origins, ethnic practices, and so on—to the dynamically complex and rich cross-cultural 
psychology of various selves within, between, and among each person.  Profiling systems that support 
space security must address and resolve this problem. 
 
Personality as Non-Psychological via Non-Narration.  In this discussion, although personality has been 
deemed psychological by definition, most professional notions of personality—be they macro-theories 
or particularistic, elemental depictions—severely constrain the psychology that is mined via a limited 
combination of methodological implements.  Life stories and life histories as conceived and perceived by 
persons being assessed, self-valued life themes and occurrences, and other richly textured aspects of 
human awareness seem less significant for the personality constructions of the experts, more so for 
laypersons.  This finding suggests an unfortunate set of narratives for formal and advanced psychological 
education and the application of so-called psychological knowledge.  In essence, the person becomes 
lost via personality to the detriment of security programs. 
 
A Conclusion.  It thus appears that applied quests in the real world based on the personality construct 
face huge challenges.  So, for example, addressing sabotage, espionage, and terrorism through 
preventing, minimizing, and managing these threats from, as opposed to merely to members of one’s 
organization, must occur with care.  Addressing such problematic behaviors is a matter of security.  
Addressing them through understanding, predicting, and influencing people is a matter of personality.  
The greater challenge is forging a syncretic product of the two—personnel security.  (See Alexander, I.E.  
(1990). Personology: Method and content in personality assessment and psychobiography. Durham, NC, 
USA: Duke University Press; Elms, A.C.  (1994).  Uncovering lives: The uneasy alliance of biography and 
psychology.  London: Oxford University Press; Perplexed and circumplexed: The structure of social 
behavior in a political world.  (September 26, 1997.)  IBPP, 3(9), http://security.pr.erau.edu; Runyan, W.  
(1997).  Studying lives: Psychobiography and the conceptual structure of personality psychology. In R. 
Hogan & J. A. Johnson (Ed.).  Handbook of personality psychology. (pp. 41-69). San Diego, CA, US: 
Academic Press, Inc.; Sloan, T.  (Ed.).  (2001). Critical psychology: Voices for change. New York, NY, US: 
St. Martin's Press, Inc.; The construct of personality: Implications for psychological profiles, Background 
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investigations, and Intelligence Agent Preassessment and Evaluation.  (July 31, 1998).  IBPP, 5(5), 
http://security.pr.erau.edu.; Young-Bruehl, E.  (1994).  A history of Freud's biographies.  In M. S. Micale 
& R. Porter (Eds.). Discovering the history of psychiatry. (pp. 157-173).  New York: Oxford University 
Press.) (Keywords: Personality, Personnel Security.) 
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